This is the start of a new weekly post highlighting some of the news and analysis in the area of cyber security that has caught our attention. Week 30 links follow:

• SCADA System’s Hard-Coded Password Circulated Online for Years
• Cyber Attack Attribution Important to Cybersecurity, Says Committee
• Chinese army to target cyber war threat
• USCYBERCOM: The Need for a Combatant Command versus a Subunified Command

I would not be posting on this blog for an unspecified period of time due to certain personal developments. I need time to sort them out. Thank you for reading my blog so far and for commenting on it.

Can a suicide bomber claim to be as much a victim of explosive as the innocent people killed by that bomber?

In response to British PM David Cameron’s statement at Bangalore about Pakistan’s links with terror, here is the complete official statement from Pakistan’s foreign office:

Terrorists have no religion, no humanity, no specific ethnicity or geography. Terrorists’ networks, as the UK knows full well mutate and operate in different regions and cities. The genesis of terrorism as a global phenomenon warrants close attention. Pakistan is as much a victim of terrorism as are Afghanistan, India or other countries.

Pakistan has done much more than any other country in combating terrorism. Our people and security forces have rendered innumerable sacrifices. We hope that our friends will be able to persuade India to view this issue objectively and the value of “cooperation” in counter terrorism.[Link]

“Pakistan is as much a victim of terrorism as are Afghanistan, India or other countries.” Indeed. Truer lies were never spoken. For as that Jewish saying goes, “A half-truth is a full lie.”

The complete truth is this: Pakistan may be a victim of terrorism along with India but the terror that India suffers is owed completely to Pakistan. For decades now, Pakistan has used terror as an instrument of state policy against India — as a strategic tool of its diplomatic and national security policy. And it has not been merely limited to something that has been an outcome of an Islamist- jehadi ideology which has occupied the centre-stage in last two decades. In the 1980s, Pakistan’s abetment and promotion of terror in Punjab had little to do with some non-state actors spreading their rabid version of jehad in India. Even today, while Pakistan acts against the terror groups threatening the Pakistan army and its intelligence agencies [this explains where Pakistani "people and security forces have rendered innumerable sacrifices"], it doesn’t merely turn a blind-eye but actively promotes India-centric terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba.

If Indians were to view this issue objectively — as the Pakistan foreign office suggests — they would only come to this conclusion: can a suicide bomber claim to be as much a victim of explosive as the innocent men, women and children killed by that bomber?

Ever since they were discovered in the caves of Qumran, the unanswered question has been: who wrote the Dead Sea Scrolls. There have been many theories though. It was widely believed to have been written by a messianic Jewish sect called the Essenes who moved to Qumran to escape Roman persecution. Then last year one scholar suggested that there were no Essenes; the Essenes were a fabrication by the 1st century historian Flavius Josephus. According to the new theory the scrolls were written by Sadducees, a sect descending from the high priest Zadok.

The Dead Sea Scrolls are important because they are the oldest known copies biblical manuscripts we have. They are important because they demonstrate the length Jews were willing to go to protect what they considered Scripture. The scrolls are important because while they have nothing whatsoever to do with Christianity (i.e., nothing to do with John the Baptist, James the brother of Jesus, Jesus, or the early Christian community), they demonstrate that the Christians were not the only Jewish sect reinterpreting Hebrew scripture and applying it toward their leader (the “Teacher of Righteousness” as opposed to Jesus), awaiting a Messiah (actually, two Messiahs were expected at Qumran as opposed to only one (Jesus) in Christianity), engaging in ritual purification (cf. baptism in Christianity), holding property in common (cf. Acts 2:44-45), and awaiting a final, apocalyptic battle (cf. the War Scroll at Qumran and the New Testament book of Revelation).[Writing the Dead Sea Scrolls Airs on National Geographic Channel: Some Reflections]

Yesterday National Geographic had a special (video) on this topic which brings new answers.

But new research suggests many of the Dead Sea Scrolls originated elsewhere and were written by multiple Jewish groups, some fleeing the circa-A.D. 70 Roman siege that destroyed the legendary Temple in Jerusalem.

According to an emerging theory, the Essenes may have actually been Jerusalem Temple priests who went into self-imposed exile in the second century B.C., after kings unlawfully assumed the role of high priest.

This group of rebel priests may have escaped to Qumran to worship God in their own way. While there, they may have written some of the texts that would come to be known as the Dead Sea Scrolls.

Many modern archaeologists such as Cargill believe the Essenes authored some, but not all, of the Dead Sea Scrolls.[Dead Sea Scrolls Mystery Solved?]

Related posts:

1. Dead Sea Scrolls and Proton Beams Given a particle accelerator and the Dead Sea Scrolls, what would you do? If you are from Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare in Italy, you would send proton beams of...
2. Searching for the Historical Jesus (2) For the faithful, the Bible is the word of God; for the historian it is not since there are major discrepancies among gospels. For example, the genealogy of Jesus differs...
3. The Christ in Christmas During the holiday season, should you say “Merry Christmas” or “Happy Holidays”? It seems some retailers have switched to the politically correct Happy Holidays, resulting in badly written online petitions...

Enough about curry and cricket.

U.K.’s Prime Minister David Cameron is in India on a three day state visit. His visit comes on the heels of his trip to Turkey, where he pledged to support that country’s membership to the European Union. Some say that is part of the Mr. Cameron’s new foreign policy initiative to woo the East. Indeed, in an op-ed in The Hindu, Mr. Cameron declared as much:

From the British perspective, it’s clear why India matters. Most obviously, there is the dynamism of your economy. In the U.S., they used to say: “Go West, young man” to find opportunity and fortune. For today’s entrepreneurs, the real promise is in the East. But your economy isn’t the only reason India matters to Britain. There’s also your democracy with its three million elected representatives — a beacon to our world. There is your tradition of tolerance, with dozens of faiths and hundreds of languages living side by side — a lesson to our world. And there is this country’s sense of responsibility. Whether it’s donating reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, peacekeeping in Sierra Leone or providing intellectual leadership in the G20, India is a source of strength to our world. [The Hindu]

Faced with government debt and high levels of unemployment, Mr. Cameron will do what he must to revive his country from the global economic slump. At the backdrop of a domestic debate on immigration, Mr. Cameron arrived in Bangalore — not New Delhi — visiting Infosys’ technology park and HAL, where a $800 million deal between BAE and HAL for 57 advanced jet trainers (AJTs) was signed.

The U.K. is already India’s largest trading partner in the E.U. Trade between India and the U.K. has, and will continue to amble along, increasing annually in absolute terms, while decreasing in terms of U.K.’s overall contribution to India’s economy. Certainly, India is open for business and any mutually beneficial opportunity for trade and commerce is welcome. But if the goal of Mr. Cameron’s visit is to forge the bonds of an “enhanced relationship” with India,we will need to move beyond the (dare I say) mundane and begin talking about issues of strategic importance to each other; for India, this includes energy and security. Indeed, France has shown that such an engagement model can be successful.

In this respect, news of progress on civilian nuclear cooperation and the AJT deal, though long overdue, is perhaps welcome. However, it is as yet unclear if U.K.’s leaders truly understand and are willing to commit to a more broad-based partnership with India. It is also unlikely that India will bother to sit around and wait.

National Security Advisor must institutionalise a weekly meeting at the level of the five secretaries concerned with national security.

In light of the Government of India pulling in different directions before, during and after the meeting between foreign ministers of India and Pakistan, K Subrahmanyam issues a timely reminder about fine-tuning the working mechanisms of the government when it comes to national security.

All this does not rule out the need for better coordination among the concerned ministries dealing with various aspects of national security. The realisation of the need for such coordination brought into existence the office of the national security adviser. Those who believed in the conventional philosophy of governance in which every cabinet minister practised a “live and let live” style of governance did not welcome the NSA. It has taken more than 12 years for that office to evolve into its appropriate role of a coordinator instead of being an independent executive in the national security set-up.

But, to be effective, the coordination should be at two levels, as in the US. The first level is that of five cabinet ministers who form the National Security Council. The second level is of the five secretaries dealing with national security: the cabinet secretary and foreign, defence, home and finance secretaries. In the US NSC set-up, they have a weekly deputies’ meeting to effect coordination and thrash out the issues before they reach the NSC under the president. Most of the hard and complicated work gets done initially at this level. Such weekly meetings sensitise key officials to issues of national security in a holistic manner and make them a coherent team. The Indian NSA should give thought to institutionalising a weekly meeting at the level of the five concerned secretaries. That would improve the coordination among the five national security ministries.[Indian Express]

The benefits of such close cooperation among various ministries should have been evident to the government after the cooperation offered by Bangladesh in handing over leaders of North-Eastern terror groups to India. The recent agreements(pdf) signed by the government with the military government of Myanmar are also a step in the same direction — primarily aimed to strangulate the North Eastern terror groups who have found a safe haven in that country.

The need for closer cooperation among various ministries must have been further driven home by the recent FATF report on Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in India. The report is extremely critical about the capability of Indian laws to counter terrorist financing.

To put it in simpler terms, no single ministry can no longer claim to be the sole repository of any national security policy. While each such ministry will, and should, remain the face of its domain, the overall policy goals will have to be formulated after considering the views of all the stake-holders. India cannot afford a repetition of the Islamabad fiasco which was borne more as much out of a lack of coordination, than as much from a lack of direction. The suggestion from Mr Subrahmanyam to the NSA to coordinate among the five secretaries thus could not have been more timely.

Let us institutionalise this weekly meeting of the NSA. Now.

Following the 2004 tsunami, marine archaeology was done at Poompuhar and it was found to be a big port dating back to 3rd century BCE. Due to lack of funds, the excavation was stopped. The good news is that excavations are going to start again.

Before a full-fledged excavation is undertaken, a geophysical survey of the areas to be excavated would be conducted using echo-sounders (to detect objects on the sea bed), side-scan sonars (to scan the sea bed) and sub-bottom profilers (that function like an echo-cardiogram and detects objects beneath the sea bed). 

“After a geophysical survey, we send down divers,” said Kamalesh Vora, scientist-in-charge, marine archaeology centre, NIO. Equipped with diving gear, underwater cameras, excavation tools, special plastic sheets and pencils, and measuring tape, 

NIO divers will scour the ocean bed, at 20 metres depth, to explore and document sunken towns and their treasures. [Post-tsunami, raising the lost treasures of Poompuhar challenge divers]

Related posts:

1. Pavlopetri, Dwaraka etc. That is the video of a 5000 year old submerged town —- almost a complete town with separate buildings, courtyards, streets and graves — in Greece. Pavlopetri was a harbor town which...

Defense Minister AK Antony has finally made a statement on the recent cyber espionage events reported in “Shadows in the Cloud“. Please do read the response – “Hacking of Security Information“, it won’t take a lot of time. It it is a relief to actually see someone actually asking the questions at the right level and the questions are being answered. Now let us take a look at the answer (emphasis added).

certain internet facing computers were compromised by the hackers which had no sensitive defence data

While it is reassuring that the Minister thinks no sensitive data was leaked, something doesn’t add up. The report states:

“Although there is public information available on these military projects, it indicates that the attackers managed to compromise the right set of individuals that may have knowledge of these systems that is not publicly known. We recovered documents and presentations relating to the following projects:

(*) Pechora Missile System – an anti-aircraft surface-to-air missile system.

(*) Iron Dome Missile System – a mobile missile defence system (Ratzlav-Katz 2010).

(*) Project Shakti – an artillery combat command and control system (Frontier India 2009).

We also found that documents relating to network centricity (SP’s Land Forces 2008) and network-centric warfare had been exfiltrated, along with documents detailing plans for intelligence fusion and technologies for monitoring and analysing network data (Defence Research and Development Organisation 2009).

That is of course just the “defence” bit. It is hard to believe that all those information on the missile systems and warfare strategy are public knowledge. Now to approach the “sensitive” non defence part of the report’s content:

We recovered one document that appears to be an encrypted diplomatic correspondence, two documents classified as “SECRET”, six as “RESTRICTED”, and five as “CONFIDENTIAL”. These documents contain sensitive information taken from a member of the National Security Council Secretariat concerning secret assessments of India’s security situation in the states of Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura, as well as concerning the Naxalites and Maoists. In addition, they contain confidential information taken from Indian embassies regarding India’s international relations with and assessments of activities in West Africa, Russia/Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East, as well as visa applications, passport office circulars and diplomatic correspondence. The attackers also exfiltrated detailed personal information regarding a member of the Directorate General of
Military Intelligence.

It is indeed true that none of these are defence data but it sure looks sensitive.

So, either all these exfiltrated information was public knowledge (highly unlikely) or India doesn’t consider any of these (including the missile programme details) as “sensitive defence data” or the report is wrong or of course the Minister has not been properly informed.

Pick your poison, I guess.

Services Headquarters have an information security policy and their networks are audited as per the guidelines.

I hope not the 27001 audit!

By Ipsita Shome

Privacy has long been regarded as a right of a democracy. In his seminal essay On Liberty, the English philosopher John Stuart Mill emphasized the importance of a private sphere that is protected against incursions by the state and the interference of others. Although privacy is not an explicitly mentioned constitutional right in India as in some other countries, there have been several instances where this issue has been addressed by the judiciary. Many argue, public figures are consequentially baggers of the responsibility medal; the more iconic thy market value – the more be thy accountability quotient and the inevitable camera zoom. But whilst most accept that as public servants, politicians are accountable to the masses and must therefore expect a level of media scrutiny, many argue that the aggressive intrusion in to the private lives of celebrities is beyond the pale, and represents a downward turn in the integrity and gravity of the Indian press.

The Indian media has undeniably experienced a profound shift in the last twenty years. Prior to the wide-ranging project of market liberalization in the 1990′s, Indians only had access to the broadcasts of Doordarshan, the state-run TV network. However, now we have over 300 cable channels to choose from, which include 30 news channels broadcasting in almost all of India’s 22 official languages. In this milieu it is no surprise that there is a frantic race for new material, to have an edge over rivals. Some argue that in the race for stories, news has become melodrama, disasters/tragedies become cash cows and private life becomes media fodder. It is against this backdrop that some are arguing for content control via legislation. But defenders of the media are resolute. Their counterpoint: In a free society no fetters can be placed on the press. It is only by encouraging more free speech not less, they say, that public discourse and standards in journalism will improve.

The question lies here – should a foil at personal notifications emerge as a blockage to the right to information? Especially for the ones who lie liable for the generic breed of a national or global cohort? Pack journalists, or those who implement the practice, are at fault, because they perpetuate questionable issues of journalistic laziness, short-term and long-term misguidance, and an unreliable spring of resource which is not at all authenticated, hampering the moralistic stand of the concerned or his/her image. Inevitably the impasse posses to be obligatory and the journalistic packs howl for the RTI grant. Regardless of the one-sided criticism, media’s role as a watchdog has yielded years of filtered democracy (exploitative or not), several complimentary public figures and a couth sense of social decorum. To our peril, we have the epitomizing revelations of the Jekyll face of the media after the Uma Khurana episode and the arbitrary Hyde leaping to our rescue with eye-openers like that of the Army-Coffin scandal, the 2009 BMW sting.

An example for each of the facets will clear the mist:-

• Eleven MPs — 10 from the Lok Sabha and 1 from the Rajya Sabha– were expelled from the Parliament in December 2005 after a TV channel showed them taking bribes for asking questions in the House. “The whole country had watched the sting operation but the police seems to have no eyes and no ears,” Justice S N Dhingra said, when the Delhi Police apparently turned deaf-ears for nearly about two years to the profanity caught on camera. The public glare on the issue caused the judiciary to take stern steps against the police and the consequential action on the subject MPs thereafter. Media’s role was evidently commendable.
• Mir Ranjan Negi was the hapless Indian goalkeeper and was pilloried in the media following the humiliating 1-7 defeat arch-foes Pakistan in the 1982 Asian Games final at Delhi. Some of the tabloids ruthlessly ran headlines howling – Pakistan had bribed Negi and that he was a ‘traitor’. Career and life went for an unplumbed collapse. Negi was nowhere to be seen in the Indian hall of credits for 16 years or so, until he proved himself back to glory with the 2002 commonwealth victory by the national women’s hockey team as a coach. Evidently, a faction of his ‘deserved life’ was snatched for the utter span of media frenzy and sensationalism.

Broadcast legislation should mandate it as a licensing requirement for channels in the public interest that the information about the entire media board of directors and their antecedents should be placed in public domain. Only a listed group companies have their information sorted and available. But it takes a highly motivated, savvy search to discover the information. This information should be made easily available to people who visit their websites, as has been made mandatory for state-run institutions under the RTI Act. If we accept journalism as a special category of business that is allowed sweeping powers to access and disseminate information, it is also necessary to treat it as a special category of business with special requirements to practice transparency.

For Oscar Wilde said, “Man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth.” – Defining the media couldn’t have been easier without this. It’s all a fancy dress, be masqueraded, churn out the truth. Just yearn to have better sets of Yes Brothers in the field, who know how to channelize sensationalism and raise a cause without the antibiotic side-effects.

Let’s focus on the real problems with the China-Pakistan nuclear agreement.

MUMBAI—ArmsControlWonk takes a look at the debate among nuclear technology watchers on the China-Pakistan civil nuclear agreement. Ashley Tellis and Mark Hibbs are called upon for representative arguments, Tellis downplaying any link between this development and the U.S.-India nuclear agreement while Hibbs, his colleague at the Carnegie Endowment, highlighting the Chinese use of the Indo-U.S. deal as justification for their actions.

I think there’s little doubt that the two agreements are linked—with the Chinese deal retaliatory—but the debate, framed this way, misses a number of crucial points.

First, it is important to emphasize not just the timing, which ACW focuses upon, but rather Tellis’s main argument that the two arrangements are not quite equatable. In fact, as I’ve noted earlier, that equation coming from the most ardent advocates of arms control is damaging precisely because it justifies Chinese actions.

Second, there’s not much discussion here of prior Sino-Pakistani arrangements; the most recent deal is only a continuation of a history of shady activities between the two. It’s important to place this in context, not simply consider it a one-off event.

Third, what is more important than whether the United States successfully resisted such moves in the past, is the fact that Washington has been remarkably passive in even attempting to resist the most recent arrangement. That cannot be explained away so easily.

Finally, there’s another trigger to the Sino-Pakistani nuclear agreement, as I have noted earlier, one that, if true, is much more insidious than the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal: that the United States agreed in March to look the other way—wink, wink, nod, nod—in exchange for Chinese cooperation on Iranian sanctions. More needs to be dug out on this, but several reputable sources have independently discussed this unwritten arrangement, although none close enough to the prime participants to treat this as an absolute certainty.

It doesn’t matter whether India talks directly to GHQ in Pakistan or not; because India doesn’t have the capacity to make the other side listen.

Mehmal Sarfaraz, Op-ed editor of The Daily Times, has a piece in today’s Hindustan Times which argues contrary to its title: Why should India talk to the army? [LT: Smita Prakash] She collates the arguments from Pakistani writers to suggest that such clamour in some Indian circles to bypass the democratically elected government of Pakistan is fallacious and unsound.

Now this idea of Government of India talking directly to Pakistan army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) has gained some traction in recent days after the failure of Indo-Pak talks at Islamabad. While this idea sounds great in theory, a closer scrutiny reveals that it is both unsubstantial, and a non-starter. Firstly, it should not be forgotten that India has no power to choose to whom it will talk to in the Pakistani government or establishment. For that matter, even the civilian government in Pakistan doesn’t have the power to decide who will talk to India from their side. This was conclusively proved in the aftermath of Mumbai terror attacks, when despite the wishes of the democratically-elected, civilian governments of both the countries, the ISI chief’s proposed visit to Delhi was vetoed by the GHQ. Thus the idea that India can pick and choose its Pakistani interlocutors is in itself a non-starter.

It is not only India that the GHQ is capable of snubbing. When the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was in Islamabad recently for the second round of US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, it was she who was forced to go and call on General Kayani at his office. General Kayani’s reticence to call on Ms Clinton is not merely a breach of diplomatic protocol but a veridical snub to the United States, a country that veritably bankrolls the organisation that General Kayani heads, the Pakistan army. Considering the disdain with which the GHQ currently treats the US, to expect it to reciprocate to a serious Indian offer of direct talks is indeed far-fetched.

Moreover, if India were to place such a demand, what stops Pakistan from making a similar demand on India? Will India accept it if the GHQ says that it will only talk to Mr Chidambaram, and not with Mr Krishna? Such a demand would certainly be unacceptable to Indian government.

Let us accept for a moment that somewhat miraculously, notwithstanding such an offer being construed by Pakistan army as a sign of India’s weakness, GHQ agrees to hold direct talks with the Indian government. And the dialogue proceeds wherein India, at some point, asserts: Stop this proxy war and export of jehadi terror to India…Or…; and the GHQ taunts: …Or what,…what will you do?

What will you do? The question that all the commentators who further this idea wish to skirt is about the India’s inability to enforce its will over the Pakistan army. India has little leverage over Pakistan, whether diplomatic, economic or military. While creating a leverage in the first two domains may not be in India’s sole control, regenerating and building up its military capacity is a course that India can single-handedly pursue. [See this blogpost on why the only way for India to have successful peace talks with Pakistan is by building its military capacity.]

To put it bluntly, there is no incentive for the GHQ to listen to India now. Once India has the ability to generate that coercive power to hurt GHQ’s interests, only then would it be willing for talks with India. [Dinkar’s classic Hindi poem Shakti aur Kshama captures this dilemma poetically. Read it here.]

That is the crux of the matter. It is not about talks. It is not about what we talk either. It is also not about whom we talk to: for irrespective of the face we may see in Pakistan, the voice we hear — and the message that it delivers — will always come from the same quarters in Rawalpindi. It is about our capacity to make them listen.

If we have the capacity to make them listen, i.e., deliver a credible message, the face won’t matter. The message will automatically reach the right quarters in Rawalpindi.

Beware the General with the extended contract.

When Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani announced his government’s decision to extend COAS Gen. Kayani’s term for another three years, he was merely formalizing an arrangement that many had already foreseen months ago. Media reaction to Gen. Kayani’s extension in Pakistan has swayed from grudging acceptance (The News) to complete endorsement (نوائے وقت, ایکسپریس). On the face of it, this is a matter internal to Pakistan, and the Government of India has rightly chosen not to comment on the extension.

Three issues, however, feature prominently in Pakistan’s press on favoring an extended tenure for Gen. Kayani — the war on terrorism, upholding the laws of the nation, and security. It is the third that should be of concern to India; indeed, if history has taught us one thing, it is that secure generals in Rawalpindi have taken decisions that negatively impact India’s internal security. Men in power at GHQ have historically been poor judges of how far they can push the button, either internally or as it relates to India. We need not delve too far back into history to realize that precedents exist. The events leading up to October 1999 serve as a reminder. Nazim Zehra explains:

Musharraf had then clearly stayed away from the political situation as journalists had queried about the ability of the present system’s ability to ‘deliver’ given Pakistan’s major problems. His response to a question related to constitutional change was unambiguous. This relates to constitutional changes, an issue which only the country’s political leadership can address, he had definitively said. He was straight and honest recalling that when he had taken over as the COAS people around me held different views about Nawaz Sharif ‘s relations with the army leadership.

What was striking about the general was how he related to the team around him. Not only did he ensure the presence of at least half a dozen of his key lieutenants through his press encounter, he also let them speak. More so let them interrupt him, correct him on occasions. Only a general, secure about his authority would allow such public display of freedom of expression from his men. Musharraf had come across as a secure general; a team player. [Defence Journal]

Then there was Kargil.

The difference between 1999 and 2010, of course, is that in Parvez Musharraf, you had a general who had no backing from the United States (up until the events of 9/11), while Kayani today enjoys popular support from folks in Arlington, Vir. And the U.S. is notorious for its weakness for scotch-drinking Pakistani generals; even more so when they are graduates of army colleges in the U.S. Gen. Kayani is described in the U.S. as a “soft-spoken intellectual” and “apolitical.” As if this “soft-spokenness” is a virtuous quality.

Yet, of all the 14 chiefs of army staff to have served Pakistan, only one man holds the distinction of having commanded both Pakistan’s premiere intelligence agency, the ISI, and the Pakistani army. That man is Gen. Kayani. That Gen. Kayani played an integral part in ensuring that talks between S.M. Krishna and his counterpart in Pakistan failed should be no surprise. What Gen. Kayani does or doesn’t do within the confines of Pakistan’s political environment is a matter entirely internal to Pakistan.

However, “secure” Pakistani generals have displayed a knack for misunderstanding their relative power within the Pakistani establishment and misconstruing their ability to force India’s hand on “unresolved issues.” And this is something that India needs to be wary of.

By K. Subrahmanyam

Speaking on terrorism, the National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon has disclosed in a recent seminar “It has been brought home recently by what we learnt from Headley which confirms many things we knew before. And it is really the links between the official establishment and with existing intelligence agencies.” As is to be expected the Pakistani spokesperson has totally denied the allegation and has termed it a “fabrication”. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has also told the press that details of Headley interrogation had been made available to Pakistani authorities though she did not go into details. Her charge that in her belief some people in Pakistani officialdom should know where Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar were, also brought out a vigorous denial from Prime Minister Gilani who challenged that if anybody had any intelligence on it that should be made available to Pakistani authorities.

Our National Security Adviser and our Home Secretary are not the first to talk about the linkage between the Pakistani establishment(meaning the Army) and terrorism. This has been done earlier by the UN panel to investigate the circumstances of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. The panel concluded: Ms. Bhutto faced threats from a number of sources. “These included al-Qaida, the Taliban, local jihadi groups and potentially from elements in the Pakistani establishment.But the Pakistani investigation after the assassination,focused on pursuing “lower level operatives,” not those further up the hierarchy. The Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence conducted parallel investigations, gathering evidence which was only selectively shared with the police. The failure of the police to investigate effectively Ms. Bhutto’s assassination was deliberate. “These officials, in part fearing intelligence agencies’ involvement, were unsure of how vigorously they ought to pursue actions, which they knew, as professionals, they should have taken”.

The commission urged Pakistani authorities to carry out a “serious, credible” criminal investigation that “determines who conceived, ordered and executed this heinous crime of historic proportions, and brings those responsible to justice. “Doing so would constitute a major step toward ending impunity for political crimes in this country,” To address the broader issue of impunity for political crimes, the commission called for Pakistan to consider establishing a “fully independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate political killings, disappearances and terrorism in recent years” and provide victims with “material and moral reparations….. the autonomy, pervasive reach and clandestine role of intelligence agencies in Pakistani life underlie many of the problems, omissions and commissions set out in this report.” The Commission urged the government to conduct a thorough review of intelligence agencies “based on international best practices” and reform the police to ensure “democratic policing” and protection of individual human rights.

Though the victim of the terror dealt with in the report of the UN panel was the most charismatic leader of the country, the Chairperson of the party now ruling and wife of the present president, Foreign Minister Quereshi of Pakistan wrote a letter to the UN Secretary-General finding fault with report of the panel.. Qureshi took issue with repeated but proof-lacking finger-pointing at the role of Pakistani security agencies and the establishment. In particular, the foreign minister said that comments and observations about the Pakistan Army, the Inter-Services Intelligence or the so-called establishment, were only the opinions of the members of the Commission. They did not represent authenticated determinations based on any fact or evidence. Qureshi added that the report had a serious flaw because the commission had failed to approach third states to provide some reliable information to unearth, if any, international linkages perpetrating, planning, financing or abetting the assassination of Benazir. In his response to Qureshi, UN Secretary-General Ban -Ki-moon said he fully backed the UN’s three-man committee which probed the December 2007 murder, and that it carried out its work ‘professionally’. The secretary general underlined that the commission, which was headed by Heraldo Munoz, Chile’s former UN ambassador, conducted its inquiry under the terms of reference agreed to between the Pakistan government and the UN Secretariat, and noted by the Security Council.

This development highlights that the civilian Government in Pakistan is so much under the control of the army it is compelled to disown the criticism of the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence even in respect of the murder of the ruling party’s former chairman,the president’s wife and the tallest leader of the country. It is somewhat ironic that Quereshi found fault with the UN panel for not getting reliable information from third countries. That is exactly what Headley’s interrogation report provides. Yet Prime minister Gilani does not find the evidence against the LET chief Hafeez Saeed, sufficient.

In this context, Nitin Pai of Takshasila Foundation has raised a very pertinent question. The Indian and even the US pressure on Pakistan is based on the assumption that Pakistani Army and the ISI are in a position to take action and suppress the Jehadi elements in that country. Nitin Pai questions whether this assumption is wholly valid. He argues that the Pakistani state and society simply do not have what it takes to dismantle, demobilise and de-radicalise the hundreds of thousands of militants that operate in that country. In addition, we should also take into account the enormous suicide bomber arsenal Pakistani Army and ISI have permitted the Jehadi organizations to build and accumulate against which they have no adequate defence as was demonstrated in the attacks on the GHQ,near-by mosque ,various Intelligence establishments. and other defence installations.

The reluctance of the Pakistani Army to take action against Haqqani faction, LET and other organizations may not be as the US intelligence maintains, because they constitute ‘valuable assets against India and other countries in the possible post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan scenario of which the Pakistan Army appears to have convinced itself. It may well be they are afraid of the consequences of such action. Reports from Pakistan speak of Army’s campaigns in Swat and South Waziristan not having succeeded in eliminating the Taliban and their creeping back into the areas from which they were expelled. Haqqani faction and LET are capable of inflicting far more retaliatory damage on Pakistani Army and civil society than the Pakistani Taliban.

While this consideration should not come in the way of India continuing to maintain its communications with Islamabad through dialogues, there is a vital need to assess jointly with US authorities whether Pakistani Army has the will and capability to crush the Jehadis in their country and if they do not have, what effective counter-terrorism strategy the two countries should adopt to contain the terrorism emanating from Pakistan and simultaneously destroying that country.

[This column first appeared in the Dainik Jagaran newspaper of 25 July, 2010.]

By Ipsita Shome

Foreign policy agenda of the US state department: “to create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the ‘benefit’ of the ‘American people’ and the international community.” Adding a morsel more to the United States’ narcissist external political scheme, its Senate, since President Wilson’s regime, has been continually rejecting the stand and purpose of the Treaty of Versailles. Regardless of the monopolizing tendencies summed up at the Fourteen points – Paris Peace conference, the peripheral outcome wouldn’t have been as gross and harsh as it is today. Henry Cabot Lodge, Wilson’s contemporary House leader, had ample foresight to predict the disappointing world status the United States would have had if the Versailles treaty, with the inputs of the fourteen points, molded the foreign policy of the same to an unwanted contour.

The subject world power has a unique trait. The Octopus feature, or so, you may call it. With ever elongating tentacles and the imperceptible ink, it can now be regarded as the annexationist-imperium.

From its NATO allies to the MNNAs (Major non-NATO ally); from its bilateral relationships with UK, Canada, Australia to its counter-terrorism ‘efforts’ in the West & South Asian fronts – it has structured itself well as a global autocracy rather than the constitutional federal democracy.

The 9/11 tragedy was fluidly blamed on Pakistan-ISI’s lavish establishments of training camps, madrassahs, fund-inputs and much more. Not defending ISI’s role in the entire process, US’ anti-terrorism machination is more draconian and malignant than Pakistan’s alleged pro-terrorism partakes.

Nazi Germany was not characterized by neoliberal reforms. One of the major reasons why there was colossal support for the Nazi programme in the middle to late ‘30s was because there was an evidential promise of employment and the German military machine thus was in full swing. Showing belief in the need for newer policies of economic growth in addition to traditional liberalistic values could have helped the US build up an honest financial empire. But paradoxically, it chose the Hitler way and indulged in a parasitic maneuver of economic upliftment rather than the customary utilization of national resources for the same.

Showing ersatz environmental concerns towards global warming and the likes, the US has successfully dumped the responsibility (via carbon sequestration) on the supposed third world, developing nations – namely – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Sri Lanka. A premeditative initiative to thwart the rapidly escalating economic prowess of the mentioned. A bulky sum in lieu of the industrial downhill is never a compensation enough for the limitations and boundaries attached to the elastic financial camp is almost a fiscal suicide.

However humanitarian its concerns are, they ultimately get twisted to a dogmatic doctrine of foreign policy. Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Afghanistan and Iran have been under constant surveillance for the imports of illicit drugs and their production. US has predictably leaped to lend a helping hand to fight the unlawful shipment. Thomas Schweich, former U.S. State Department Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs asserts that, opium production within the Afghan borders is protected by the government of Hamid Karzai as well as by the Taliban for it be though illegal, is a perennial feed to Afghanistan’s grassroots economy. Albeit it should be taken into account, how non-profitably profitable a state Uncle Sam is. Karzai and the contemporary Talibs are nothing but marionettes of the US and act in accordance to the instructions allotted by the embassy-headquarters. Passively, the fight aka fuelling of the war against drugs is perpetually on, and will be prevalent for the time to come.

The US’ dossiers of foreign policy and international relations are nothing but piles of papyrus, which have no objective or purpose other than filling up the White House extra security vault space. The mantra is simple – target, bend, empathize, entrap, gobble & gobble some more, increase crisis, empathize again. The process is cyclic and the mode – destructive.

On 13th September 1944, Noor Inayat Khan, the first female wireless operator to be flown into occupied France, was shot dead by the Gestapo at Dachau (Germany). During the SOE interview she was asked about her motive behind joining the coldblooded warfare and the plunge into a life drenched with menace at crossroads. Her answer reflected the monotonic objective of every recruited combatant of the Allied force, or perhaps, surpassed the boundaries of time and still holds the bible purpose. Khan, “I want peace restored. Couldn’t stay behind when the world went ablaze before my eyes.”

Apart from the petite factions who join the military operations for the enlistment bonuses, restoration of family tradition or simply to pose predator to the only terrorist they know – Bin Laden, the rest are sheer examples of ardent country fans who worship their post for the power it holds, i.e. restitution of peace.

But the ulterior political and strategic drive speaks tunes fundamentally disparate.

Fear is a powerful force. The enemy is a threat, so the threatened should attack before their counter-forces. This was a widespread motive and validation for almost all ‘civilizational’ wars until recently. During the second half of the twentieth century, a new principle of international law was established which banned pre-emptive strikes on sovereign nations. Contemporarily some powerful western influentials have revised the oldest justification for hostilities by declaring that if it is in a country’s self-interest to attack another which it feels might one day become a probable peril, then the declared war is warranted. It is a move which takes us back to a world based on dread, arms races and anticipatory strikes.

The second main motive is greed. A good war bolsters political power and deflects one’s critics. In truth, wars are all about domineering and possessions, in spite of it being gift wrapped in expressions of human rights and self defense. The fact alone, that little to no thought went into the post war period demonstrates this. From the ancient Babylonians or Chinese, through the Romans and Habsburgs, British, up to the current Americans, this tendency of states to engage in almost constant warfare is strengthened by what one might call the ‘reverse domino’ effect, which equally lends credence to the phenomenon – gluttony. Military colonialism, in simpler terms.

With the strategic and tactical aspects of warfare ceaselessly varying, theories and doctrines relating to the strife are often reformulated before, during, and after every major war. And mind you, however philanthropic a war purpose may sound, it is nothing extraterrestrial. From the egotistical Indo-Pak war on Jinnah’s dreams for Kashmir to the mythological Trojan War whose legs are as rheumatic as it can get – the very basis of the “preserve peace” process is an undeviating rabid hoax. Our concern as syrupy sentimental nationalists is commendable without doubt, but, channelizing it by joining martial forces is rather detrimental to our own moral instincts and the country’s civic state. And if you are still unconvinced, please bear with the following notion which is as true as your mortal existence – You are recruited a military personnel after sessions of vigorous, thorny personal, physical and psychological tests. You go poignant with every passing country flag and the disciplinary drill. You know the job is tough but fulfilling at the same time. However you have to linger on a bit for you know little of the tainted visage of your venerated ambition is directly allied to your enrollment. You will be serving someone’s personal, political or economic agenda with your life and blood, in lieu of your much treasured rationale.

It is right to blame the lack of political will for stalling police reforms. But what about the non-existent public will?

If the centre and all the state governments were really bound by the directions of the Supreme Court, India would certainly have been a more secure country by now, and its populace better protected. On 22 September 2006, the judgement of the Supreme Court on Police Reforms required all governments, at centre and state levels, to comply with its seven directives by 31 December 2006 and to file affidavits of compliance by the 3 January 2007. As we all know now, not much progress has been achieved on that front till date.

Here is an old post on the subject which explains the directives of the Supreme Court. To sum them up, these were:

• Separate law and order from investigation
• Set up a Police Establishment Board at state level for postings and transfers
• Selection of DGP of the state with a two-year fixed tenure
• Two-year fixed tenure for IG, DIG, SP & SHO
• Set up National Security Commission for selection and posting of heads of central police organisations
• Set up police complaints authority at district and state level
• Set up state security commissions

Today’s The Tribune does a great job of summarising the present status of the progress achieved on these directives:

• Not a single state has managed to fulfil all the criteria prescribed by the Supreme Court with regard to the State Security Commission (SSCs). Most states have set up SSCs that do not reflect the court’s criteria with regard to the composition, function and powers. States such as Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh are in complete non-compliance with this directive.
• Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland are the only states that have adopted the court’s prescribed criteria with regard to the selection, tenure and removal of the Director-General of Police. A few states have only partially incorporated these criteria whilst several states such as Karnataka, Jharkhand, Haryana, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh are not compliant with this directive.
• Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and the north-eastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland are in full compliance with this directive which provides for a fixed tenure for officers on operational duties. While a few states have partially satisfied the criteria set by the Supreme Court, it is notable that the majority are not in compliance with this directive.
• Several states such as Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka and Sikkim have complied with the Supreme Court’s directive to separate the law and order police with the investigation police. However, a majority of states have not fully implemented this directive.
• Most states have established a Police Establishment Board, but only Arunachal Pradesh and Goa are in full compliance with all the court’s stipulated criteria in this regard. In contrast, Bihar is the only state which has taken no steps towards complying with this directive.
• No state government has established Police Complaints Authorities at both district and state level that fully comply with the Supreme Court’s orders. Many states have established Authorities which only partially comply with the court’s directive in terms of the composition, mandate and powers. Many states — Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh have completely ignored this directive.

Out of 636 districts in the country, 223 districts, as per MHA’s 2009 estimate, are affected by Maoist activities; another 20 districts by the Pakistan-backed jehadi war in Jammu & Kashmir; and 67 districts by the multiple insurgencies that trouble India’s North-East: that makes it 310 districts out of a total of 636. In addition, the country has suffered from and continues to live a constant threat of jehadi terror; it has suffered spectacular terror strikes — from the attack on Indian Parliament to the terror strike on Mumbai. These facts, by themselves, should have been enough incentive for the centre and state governments to pursue police reforms. But even the judgement by the Supreme Court to pursue these reforms has failed to budge them.

An oft-cited culprit for reluctance for police reforms among governments of all political hues is a lack of political will. But what is this animal called political will? Ultimately, political will is a hypothetical condition that is nearly impossible to define and measure. Evidence of political will is typically indirect and retrospective — with a failure to implement bold policy prescriptions bandied as manifesting a lack of political will, and successful implementation constituting proof of its existence. However, going by Hammergren’s characterisation of political will as “the slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon,” where it is “the sina qua non of policy success which is never defined except by its absence,” lack of police reforms in India is a indubitably a case of lack of political will.

Even if one accepts that there is no political will, what this nation doesn’t have either on the subject is the “public will”. Public will, which is committed public opinion or effective public opinion, is closely linked to political will in a representative democracy like India. Where is the visible public support for achieving policy action on police reforms in India? Without a place on the public agenda and subsequent creation of the public will, there is little chance that the political class will support police reforms. The media can play a major role in this agenda-setting process but it has, lamentably, failed to focus on this issue of grave national importance.

This non-starter experience with police reforms, despite the Supreme Court judgement, is enough proof that no major policy reform in India can happen today due to the absence of political will. In today’s times, when interests of the political class run contrary to such a policy change, only an exhibition of firm public will can lead to creation of political will to undertake police reforms. While media can play an important role in shaping the public opinion and setting the public agenda, on its own often this is not enough to effect large-scale policy change. The major impetus for this reformist initiative will have to come from the civil society.

But can India boast of such an activist civil society today? Unfortunately, the answer is in the negative.

Oh, and yes, these directives were passed by the Supreme Court in 2006, as part of its judgement on a PIL that was filed in 1996. 1996! 14 years and still counting…

Let it be said then. This nation — the political parties, the government, the media, the judiciary and even the civil society — truly doesn’t give a damn about the safety, security and protection of its own citizens.

In 1908, Leo Tolstoy wrote a letter titled  A Letter to a Hinduin Free Hindustan and a young Mohandas Gandhi reprinted this letter in his South African paper. Russia’s most prominent Christian pacifist had a profound influence on Gandhiji’s non-violent philosophy. In Russia, young men and women lived in Tolstoyan farms practicing celibacy and vegetarianism. He was considered a saint.

The final days of Tolstoy’s life was not peaceful; he was at war with his wife of 48 years. These final days are the subject of the 2009 biopic The Last Station. The Tolstoyans, led by Vladimir Chertkov, wanted to put all his writings in the public domain, a move opposed by Sofiya Tolstoy  concerned about what will happen to her.
In despair, Tolstoy left their country home, Yasnaya Polyana, on Oct. 28, 1910, taking to the road in the middle of the night, putting 48 years of marriage behind him. He died soon thereafter in a remote railway station, with his wife outside begging to be let in. She was turned away by Vladimir Chertkov, Tolstoy’s disciple and close friend, who suggested that any glimpse of her would hasten her husband’s end. Chertkov relented only when Tolstoy was in a coma, at the point of death.[The Tolstoys’ War]

Helen Mirren (Sofiya), Christopher Plummer (Tolstoy) and Paul Giamatti (Chertkov) have put such soul into the characters which makes this a recommended movie.

No related posts.

except that it does not!

The recent Times of India article, on how Indian Army is increasing its network and system defences to “highest standard”, is interesting in that it does not say anything much at all, except the nugget of information that they perform “cyber audit process” “in accordance with established security standards such as ISO 27001″. Let us come back to the 27001 audit process later and examine the rest of the article first.

Any article that has utterances like “impenetrable” and “unhackable” automatically raises a red flag in my paranoid brain. Networks are “impenetratable” and password are “unhackable” until they are not. One would expect and associate such frivolous words from the marketing department of a software company (no disrespect to Oracle), not from the Indian Army.

The mention about Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) is confusing. Is this CERT the same as CERT-In? As far as I know CERT-In does not have a mandate over military and Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). Let not the wording “to respond to attacks” fool you into thinking that anything beyond log analysis, root cause analysis and associated steps are taken as a part of this response. Nothing in the literature and off the record conversations have shown any hints that the army is involved in anything more than passive defense when it comes to cyber security.

Now, to the juicy bit. The article states:

Another official said the army has its own cyber audit process conducted by cyber security personnel.

“The audit is conducted in accordance with established security standards such as ISO 27001. Audit of the network is a continuous and active process which helps identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities in a network to counter latest threats as also check the network for cyber security policy compliance,” he said.

Don’t get me wrong, it is heartening to see that the army is following audit processes to bolster its network and system defense and they should be commended for it. But the use of ISO 27001 just does not cut it for a military institution.

ISO 27001 is a set of audit requirements for information security management systems. There are about 10 areas requiring compliance audit, starting with institution-wide issues (Security Policy, Organization of Information Security) and eventually drilling into more operational areas (Access control, Acquisition/Development/Maintenance etc.). At the highest level, as per the audit requirements, an institution is required to establish an Information Security Management program that involves the setting up of an Information Security organization which crafts and drives InfoSec policies in the institution. 27001 then audits the subsequent sections against these policies.

As it pertains to the the claim that 27001 would make the army resilient to cyber attacks, three important points need to be kept in mid:

1. First, and most obvious, is that the efficacy of the standards established by the ISM organization themselves are not evaluated. So, while an entity may “pass” a 27001 audit, it speaks little, if any, of how strong or otherwise the organization’s information security practices are.
2. 27001 is designed for corporations that desire international certification. It is not geared for the defense establishments. The US DoD, for example, is audited by multiple agencies which more or less follow baseline standards set out by Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) and highlighted in DoD Audit Manual. Standards for information security in US DoD have gradually evolved from the earlier Bell-Lapadula model and the dozen others to the hybrids that are now in place. Again, 27001 does not even come into picture.
3. 27001 certifications are essentially policy reviews. They do not get into network/hardware/software hardening. For example there are zero penetration tests performed as part of the 27001. A 27001 certification will not give reasonable assurance to Indian Army or MoD that its infrastructure is hardened and can deter reasonably sophisticated attacks.

So while it good to know that audits are being conducted and that the system “emphasises on the people and the process”, let us not kid ourselves that mismatched ISO processes like 27001 will make the system and the networks any more secure. What we do risk is becoming complacent based on the misplaced sense of security and assurance given by these audit processes.

(With substantial contribution from Rohan Joshi.)

Focus on India, please.

In the aftermath of the Lahore talks between S.M. Krishna and S.M. Qureshi, much was written in the press about the reasons why the talks failed and on Mr. Qureshi’s antics during and after the press conference. The failure of the talks to yield anything substantial should have been a good opportunity for India to reevaluate what it is attempting to achieve vis-a-vis Pakistan and why, and determine whether its current strategy is working. Sadly, barring a few exceptions, such a dialog does not seem to be occurring; at least, not publicly.

My INI colleague over at Pragmatic Euphony has an excellent blogpost with recommendations on steps India needs to take going forward, laying out areas where the attention of India’s political leadership should be more focused. From internal security to the delivery of social services, the blogpost argues that an internally stronger India will be able to negotiate with Pakistan on a better footing.

This argument can be further extended, particularly where internal security is concerned. That Pakistan has no intention of abjuring terrorism against India is no secret. In fact, if Mr. Qureshi’s bizarre comments at the presscon, equating statements made by LeT chief Hafiz Saeed to those made by Home Secretary G.K. Pillai are anything to go by, there is no reason not to believe that Pakistan will continue to encourage rhetoric and action against India — talks or no talks. The aim of India’s internal reforms, then, should be to develop capabilities to deter Pakistan’s adventurism for sub-conventional warfare against India.

This requires refocusing on issues that have been highlighted previously on various platforms. It means accepting the reality that internal security can no longer be a part-time job for the Home Minister, and moving forward with establishing a Ministry of Internal Security, with adequate funding and staffing. It means significantly upgrading the capabilities of first responders to terror incidents — something that cannot be meaningfully achieved without police reforms.

It means fundamentally restructuring our intelligence agencies, their reporting structure, staffing, training, funding, information collection — at the local, national and international levels — and inter-agency coordination. It means revisiting existing anti-terror legislation, to provide law enforcement agencies legal and political backing, and tools necessary to effectively deter or respond to incidents. Finally, it also means equipping our agencies with the ability to challenge terrorism from whence it emanates.

Now, the argument can be made — and not without justification or precedent — that in a country that puts a premium on symbolism, expecting changes such as those highlighted above — which essentially call for a structural recalibration of the government — is far too radical. It can be argued that no one in New Delhi will have the stomach for projects whose benefits may only become visible at some distant point in the future. On the other hand, the exhibitionism we have come to expect from India-Pakistan “events” can be beneficial during election season, even if they did fail as spectacularly as Lahore, because India’s leaders went “out of their way” and “extended a hand of friendship” which was spurned by short-sighted politicians from across the border. It is just the sort of altruistic, moral pompousness that wins elections.

But Dr. Manmohan Singh, more than anyone, can appreciate what structural reforms can do for this nation. Indeed, reforms he instituted some twenty years ago have fundamentally transformed India’s economy and society. With this transformation comes the need for institutions that can effectively govern and keep pace with the India of today. This has not happened, however, and nowhere is the structural decay more telling than in institutions charged with India’s security.

Structural recalibration of India’s internal security is a long-term project whose benefits may only be realized in the distant future. But unless priority is given now, we will continue to flounder and stumble from one disaster to another while hoping that cosmetic fixes, finger wagging and rhetoric will conceal the structural decay of institutions charged with India’s internal security. It will not help India either put an end to the insurgencies that plague it nor allow it to deal effectively with the threats that will continue to emanate from Pakistan. Dr. Singh and his government must get to work: India’s internal security needs a 1991.

Focus on the India, please.

In the aftermath of the Lahore talks between External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and his counterpart, Pakistani Foreign Minister S.M. Qureshi, much has been written about the reasons why the talks failed and about Mr. Qureshi’s antics during and after the press conference. The failure of the talks to yield anything substantial should have been a good opportunity for India to reevaluate what it is attempting to achieve vis-a-vis Pakistan and why, and determine whether its current strategy is working. Sadly, barring a few exceptions, such a dialog does not seem to be occurring; at least, not publicly.

My INI colleague over at Pragmatic Euphony has an excellent blogpost with recommendations on steps India needs to take going forward, laying out areas where the attention of India’s political leadership should be more focused. From internal security, economic and labor reforms to education, public health and delivery of social services, the blogpost argues that an internally stronger India will be able to negotiate with Pakistan on a better footing.

This argument can be further extended, particularly where internal security is concerned. That Pakistan has no intentions of abjuring terrorism against India is no secret. In fact, if Mr. Qureshi’s bazarre comments at the presscon, equating statements made by LeT chief Hafiz Saeed to those made by Home Secretary GK. Pillai are anything to go by, there is no reason not to believe that Pakistan will continue to encourage rhetoric and action against India — talks or no talks. The aim of India’s internal reforms, then, should be to develop capabilities to deter Pakistan’s adventurism for sub-conventional warfare against India.

This requires refocusing on issues that have highlighted on various platforms. It means accepting the reality that internal security can no longer be a part-time job for the Home Minister — and moving forward with establishing a Ministry of Internal Security, with adequate funding and staffing. It means significantly upgrading the capabilities of first responders to terror incidents — something that cannot be meaningfully achieved without police reforms.

It means fundamentally restructuring our intelligence agencies, their reporting structure, staffing, training, funding, how they collect information — at at the local, national and international levels — and how they coordinate with each other. It means revisiting existing anti-terror legislation, to provide law enforcement agencies legal and political backing, and tools necessary to effectively deter or respond to incidents. Finally, it also means equipping our agencies with the ability to challenge terror infrastructure from whence the emanate.

Now, the argument can be made, not without justification or precedent, that in a country that puts a premium on symbolism, expecting changes such as those highlighted above — which essentially call for a structural recalibration of the government — is far too radical. It can be argued that no one in New Delhi will have the stomach for projects whose benefits may only become visible at some distant point in the future. On the other hand, the exhibitionism we have come to expect from India-Pakistan “events” can be beneficial during election season, even if they did fail as spectacularly as Lahore, because India went “out of its way” and “extended a hand of friendship” which was spurned by short-sighted leaders from across the border. It is just the sort of altruistic, moral pompousness that wins elections.

But Dr. Manmohan Singh, more than anyone can appreciate what structural reforms can do for this nation. Indeed, reforms he instituted some twenty years ago have fundamentally transformed India’s economy and society. With this transformation comes the need for institutions that can effectively govern and keep pace with an India of today. This has not happened, however, and nowhere is the structural decay more telling than in institutions charged with India’s security.

Structural recalibration of India’s internal security is a long-term project whose benefits may only be realized in the distant future, but unless priority is given now, we will continue to flounder and stumble from one disaster to another while hoping that cosmetic fixes, finger wagging and rhetoric will conceal the structural decay of institutions charged with India’s internal security. It will not help India either put an end to the insurgencies that plague it or allow it to deal effectively with the threats that will continue to emanate from Pakistan. Dr. Singh and his government must get to work: India’s internal security needs a 1991.

When ancient historians wrote their works, were they concerned about telling the truth or telling a story? What methodologies did they follow? Why did the ancient historians omit certain information or lie? The Bryn Mawr Classical Review has a review of Luke Pitcher’s, Writing Ancient History: An Introduction to Classical Historiography which looks into these questions. One point the review mentions is a different form of writing history.

One theme to which the book continually returns, and which Pitcher treats more fully here, is that the limits of historical writings cannot easily be pinned down, and can take multiple forms, and that there are many ways to engage with the historical past. Sometimes the lines between history and fiction, for example, were blurred, and that the ‘action of the swan’ means that it is not always possible for us as modern readers to understand the nature of the texts we are dealing with.

…

He brushes over the poetical and mythologically rooted ‘histories’ which continued to exist beside other prose and ‘factual’ ways of thinking historically; but it is significant for our understanding of historical writing (in Greece at least) that it emerged from different kinds of historically minded traditions.[Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2010.07.12]

A good example of a myth turning into reality was the Trojan war. Interested in the location of Homer’s Troy, Heinrich Schliemann started digging for it in Turkey. Though British archaeologist Frank Calvert had identified Hissarlik as the site of Troy, his work was over shadowed by Schliemann who published Ithaka, der Peloponnesus und Troja in which he claimed Hissarlik as the site of Troy. This is now accepted by historians.

Related posts:

1. Writing Historical Fiction (1) David Mitchell’s The Thousand Autumns of Jacob de Zoet,  a historical novel set in Japan at the turn into the 19th century is getting good reviews. See reviews here and here....
2. How Tom Hanks makes History Interesting The current issue of Time features Tom Hanks on the cover. They have anointed him as America’s Historian in Chief for producing From the Earth to the Moon, Band of...