http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2008/11/journal-more-on.html
It's clear from the Mumbai attack that terrorist organizations are inexorably moving closer to the global guerrilla model of warfare (it was an evolutionary improvement over the example the PCC set in the 2006 Sao Paulo attacks). Extremely small teams, operating autonomously, that rapidly move to attack a flexible set of objectives to achieve a leveraged and synergistic effect. Generic improvements (that can apply to a variety of motives) in technique that we can expect to see in the near future include:
Better use of infrastructure disruption. While panicked crowds and other forms of localized disruption of transportation hubs are effective, a strategic approach to disruption that includes strikes on communications, transportation and energy hubs would prolong the impact and slow the government response. The key point here is that attacks on strategic systempunkts can impact tactical environments at a distance (akin to the Parthian shot that distracts and depletes an enemy).
A focus on corporations and commercial elites. Less heavily protected than government targets and more important to the economic viability of the city. Easily "taxed" through assault in order to force a shift in operations and departures. This will run in parallel, but not replace, a bevy of attacks on foreign businesspeople (which heightens media response but has less long term impact on the city's viability).
Fear management. The combination of rapid movement and indiscriminate slaughter of civilians did achieve a high level of panic. However, in order to create panic induced casualties and prolong the psychological impact, there will be an increasing focus on channeling crowds along "fear vectors."
Media spamming to co-opt information flows. At a minimum, several Web sites and mass e-mailings that launch in parallel to the attack. It could also include multi-channel radio/TV transmissions. In either case, rather than claims of responsibility or justification (a legacy approach), the content of the messaging will be seemingly real-time information on the attack configured to maximize fear/panic, disinformation, and confusion.
The late November commando attack on Mumbai India is a great demonstration of the state of the art in "urban takedowns." Essentially, an urban takedown is an attempt by a small group of attackers to overwhelm a city and force it into a prolonged shutdown (see the site, Naxalite Rage for an excellent exploration of the incident). The attack consisted of:
A nautical assault (coup de main). Several boats. laden with explosives and commandos armed to the teeth, gained entry to the city via the port. This allowed maximal entry velocity into the city's center. However, a rapid response by the Indian naval units in the area closed off the water as an escape route.
Swarm of the city using autonomous "buddy pairs." Each pair had their own routes, minimizing the potential for fratricide. While the initial dispersion of the group was concentrated, the deployment was the opposite (this is an inversion of the formula for animal pack hunters and U-boat swarming). The pair teams shot/blew up targets en route to maximize confusion/fear.
Use of the city's infrastructure for movement and coordination. The city's transportation infrastructure was leveraged, travel by roads and the acquisition of vehicles. Cell phone communication for coordination (not confirmed yet)?
Hostage drama at international hotels. Some of the buddy pairs were able to assault international hotels, which allowed them to focus on killing foreigners. These assaults became prolonged hostage dramas when the government's forces arrived.
